Forgetting the Forgotten with Letheia, Concealing Content Deletion from
  Persistent Observers by Minaei, Mohsen et al.
Forgetting the Forgotten with Lethe
Concealing Content Deletion from Persistent Observers
Mohsen Minaei
Purdue University
mohsen@purdue.edu
Mainack Mondal
University of Chicago
mainack@uchicago.edu
Patrick Loiseau
Univ. Grenoble Alpes, CNRS,
Inria, Grenoble INP, LIG
patrick.loiseau@inria.fr
Krishna Gummadi
MPI-SWS
gummadi@mpi-sws.org
Aniket Kate
Purdue University
aniket@purdue.edu
Abstract—Most social platforms offer mechanisms allowing
users to delete their posts, and a significant fraction of users
exercise this right to be forgotten. However, ironically, users’
attempt to reduce attention to sensitive posts via deletion, in
practice, attracts unwanted attention from stalkers specifically
to those (deleted) posts. Thus, deletions may leave users more
vulnerable to attacks on their privacy in general. Users hoping
to make their posts forgotten face a “damned if I do, damned if I
don’t” dilemma. Many are shifting towards ephemeral social plat-
form like Snapchat, which will deprive us of important user-data
archival. In the form of intermittent withdrawals, we present,
Lethe, a novel solution to this problem of (really) forgetting the
forgotten. If the next-generation social platforms are willing to
give up the uninterrupted availability of non-deleted posts by
a very small fraction, Lethe provides privacy to the deleted
posts over long durations. In presence of Lethe , an adversarial
observer becomes unsure if some posts are permanently deleted
or just temporarily withdrawn by Lethe; at the same time,
the adversarial observer is overwhelmed by a large number of
falsely flagged undeleted posts. To demonstrate the feasibility
and performance of Lethe , we analyze large-scale real data
about users’ deletion over Twitter and thoroughly investigate
how to choose time duration distributions for alternating between
temporary withdrawals and resurrections of non-deleted posts.
We find a favorable trade-off between privacy, availability and
adversarial overhead in different settings for users exercising
their right to delete. We show that, even against an ultimate
adversary with an uninterrupted access to the entire platform,
Lethe offers deletion privacy for up to 3 months from the time
of deletion, while maintaining content availability as high as 95%
and keeping the adversarial precision to 20%.
I. INTRODUCTION
People freely open up about their personal life and opinions
on online social platforms (e.g., Facebook, Twitter) today. The
shared information remains available on these platforms (to
intended recipients as well as unintended observers) and is
archived by archival services until (and if) the information is
eventually deleted (or confined) by its creator. This long-term
exposure of the shared data raises numerous longitudinal pri-
vacy concerns [17], [18], [33] for the users: not only celebrities
but non-celebrities get regularly harassed and blackmailed by
data scavengers, who stalk their victims to identify sensitive
content from the shared data. Nevertheless, sensitivity of a
post is relative; it varies from person to person, and also with
life events and time in general. Thus, effective (high precision
and recall) mining of available large-scale data to find suitable
victims is not always feasible for the scavengers.
The task should have become more difficult as platforms
and Internet archives honor users’ request to delete their
data. However, these deletions actually leave the users more
vulnerable to the scavengers who can now focus only on
the withdrawn posts to find sensitive contents.1 Indeed, we
found this problem associated with content deletions to be very
practical—today multiple web services find and hoard deleted
content across different social platforms. Politwoops [36] for
Twitter, ReSavr [10] and Uneddit [15] for Reddit, StackPrinter-
Deleted [11] for Stack overflow, and YouTomb [43] for
Youtube are some of the prominent examples. In fact, Polit-
woops archived more than 1.1 million deleted tweets by 10,404
politicians, around the world in 2015 [8], and by August
2017 Uneddit serves more than 942 million deleted Reddit
comments. These services can enable attackers to specifically
mine deleted posts of users for nefarious purposes.
This large-scale identification and hoarding of deleted
content from social sites and archives pose a serious violation
of “Right to be Forgotten” and the ill-effects of this phenomena
on our social behavior will be far reaching. For example, in
one case, singer Ed Sheeran’s deletion of a tweet from 2011
was found and widely publicized in media [7] leading to his
brief disappearance from Twitter. In another case, an SNL
cast member’s deletion of racist tweets back in September
2016 [6] were tracked by third parties and subsequently
publicized. Not only celebrities but normal users also fell prey
to this phenomenon when links delisted by Google in Europe
(to honor Right to be Forgotten requests) were identified,
publicized and scrutinized by media [42]. In general, the users
today are extremely vulnerable due to the fact that, whatever
content they delete (ironically, to protect their privacy) will
possibly be identified, dissected and abused.
In spite of this threat, not surprisingly, without any better
alternatives available, information exposure control in the form
of deletions still remains a common phenomenon on the social
platforms; Mondal et al. [33] observe that a significant fraction
(∼35%) of all Twitter users have now deleted or confined
(i.e., made private) their public Twitter posts made in 2009.
Consequently, as any persistent onlooker can keep track of
such changes and go after the deleted posts, users aiming to
make observers forget their posts are left with a “damned if I
do, damned if I don’t” dilemma. This paper aims to provide a
solution to the problem.
A trivial solution is to make users not publish sensitive
1Closely associated phenomenon, “Streisand effect,” suggests that an at-
tempt to hide some information has the unintended consequence of bringing
particular attention of public to it.
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content in the first place; but this is infeasible even for ex-
tremely careful users as the sensitivity of shared data changes
drastically and unpredictably with time and life events. A
growing number of users have now shifted to ephemeral social
platforms such as Snapchat [1], where everything gets deleted
in a premeditated fashion. However, given the huge historical,
cultural, and economical value of user-generated data, it is
extremely unlikely that most next-generation social or archival
platforms will adapt to this model.
This leaves us with a hard research question: can we
offer an alternative to the next-generation social or archival
platforms that achieves the best properties of both deleting
everything (i.e., privacy) and keeping an archive of posts and
events (i.e., availability)? The aim of this work is to answer
this question affirmatively and develop a privacy mechanism
that retains the archival values of posted content and still
allows deletions while providing deniability and protection to
the users after some time of deletion, i.e., those deletions will
not be immediately discernible to even persistent onlookers.
A simple-yet-drastic proposal. We offer a simple-yet-drastic
proposal towards mitigating the problem of concealing content
deletions in presence of persistent observers while maintaining
high availability of archived content. In our proposed system,
Lethe2, we very conservatively assume that the adversary has
complete access to the archival platform and can view any
post. We presume the platform administrator is working with
the data creator (or owner) to protect the privacy of dele-
tions. Lethe employs an intermittent withdrawal mechanism
that protects privacy using two public, infinite-support time
distributions—one we call the up (or online) distribution and
the second is called down (or offline) distribution. Just before
publishing a post, Lethe samples a time duration from the up
distribution and for that time duration makes that post available
(i.e., visible) to everyone. After the up duration passes Lethe
takes an instance from the down distribution and for that time
duration hides the post from viewers.
In the same way, Lethe continues to toggle between the up
and down durations as long as the post has not been deleted
or its privacy preference has not changed. Since Lethe also
hides non-deleted posts, it will be confusing for the adversary
to distinguish whether a post is hidden by Lethe or deleted by
the owner.
Contributions. We make four key contributions.
Firstly, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first system-
atic study of the problem with content deletion in the presence
of persistent onlookers. We formalize the problem with content
deletion in the presence of a very powerful adversary who can
take snapshots of the whole platform at any point in time.
We define and analytically quantify the necessary security
notions: privacy–likelihood ratio of a post deleted or not at
any particular time, availability–fraction of time the posts
are visible and adversarial overhead–adversary’s precision
on detecting deleted posts. Based on our formalization, we
propose and evaluate a novel scheme, Lethe , to provide privacy
for users’ deletions.
2In Greek mythology, Lethe was the river of forgetfulness: all those who
drank from it experienced complete forgetfulness. The word Lethe also means
oblivion, forgetfulness, or concealment.
Secondly, we show that privacy is correlated with the
up and down distributions: (i) inversely proportional to the
hazard rate of up distribution, and (ii) inversely proportional
to the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF)
of down distribution. Moreover, we show that by picking
geometric and negative binomial distributions as the up and
down distribution, not only we achieve good privacy guar-
antees, but our notion of privacy is simplified to a decision
threshold period—duration an adversary is willing to wait
before identifying a (hidden) post in a down period as deleted.
Thirdly, we present the trade-offs between the notions
mentioned above using data from Twitter. We show that
in the case of 95% content availability, the adversary, with
an uninterrupted access to the entire platform, will have a
precision value associated with adversarial overhead below
20% even when a post has been down for more than 90 days.
In the case of a more forbearing adversary that has a decision
threshold of 180 days, the precision will only increase to 35%.
However, the system administrator can reduce the availability
of the system by a small fraction and set it to 90%, which
drops the adversary’s precision back to 20%. For a large-scale
system such as Twitter, with trillions of tweets, even precision
of 80% can result in a significant overhead for the adversary
(investigating 20 million non-deleted tweets falsely marked as
deleted each day).
Finally, we evaluate the effect of our scheme on Twitter
dataset to show the feasibility of Lethe in a real-world sce-
nario. We show that our proposal, while maintaining a trade-
off between availability and privacy, also allows interactions in
the system without much interruption. Specifically, leveraging
real-world interaction data from Twitter we show that, by
applying Lethe the utility (i.e. user interactions with posts)
remains above 99% even when content availability is 85%.
Applicability of Lethe. Users of platforms such as Twitter or
Facebook are accustomed to uninterrupted availability of their
uploaded/archived data. Any loss of availability (even if loss is
small) may be unacceptable to some users, and such platforms
can introduce Lethe as an optional feature (providing an opt-
out option for the users as well as applying Lethe only to the
posts that are at least days or weeks old) if they find that some
of their users demand privacy for their deletions. Nevertheless,
we primarily envision Lethe for the next-generation social or
archival platforms, where, unlike current ephemeral platforms
like Snapchat, the users expect to have an archive of old
memories without the fear of others breaking privacy for their
deletions.
Moreover, high availability system like Lethe will be less
effective against an adversary that devotes time and resources
on a particular user such as the case of unearthing Ed Sheeran’s
deletions [7]. Nevertheless, compared to the state-of-the-art,
Lethe raises the bar significantly: it not only offers deniability
to the celebrity for at least a few arguably important weeks,
but also significantly increases the stalker’s workload.
II. CONTEXT AND MOTIVATION
In this section, we explain how the current systems handle
content deletions and what are the problems with those privacy
methodologies. Furthermore, we motivate our proposal towards
achieving privacy and availability simultaneously.
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User-initiated spontaneous deletions. One of the widely
employed form of content deletion today is user-initiated dele-
tion; i.e., system operators remove content when the owners
explicitly asked them to do so. Almost all real world social data
sharing platforms today (e.g., Facebook, Twitter or YouTube)
provide users option to delete their uploaded content. Recent
studies [16], [33] have shown that users extensively use this
mechanism to protect the privacy of their past content—users
delete around 35% of posts within six years of posting them.
The European Union (EU) regulation of “Right to be forgot-
ten” [41], [42] which is part of EU General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) [4] is also trying to accomplish exactly
this same, albeit at a much more elaborate scale. They wish to
enable users to remove historical data about themselves from
multiple systems, including removing results from leading
search engines. Nevertheless, as we already suggest, those
deleted content attract unwanted attention [42].
Premeditated withdrawals. Complementary to these user-
initiated spontaneous deletions, a number of premeditated
withdrawal methodologies have been proposed and employed
today.
Many of those aim to protect content privacy via withdraw-
ing all posts after a predefined viewership or time of posting;
we call those the age-based withdrawals. Recent ephemeral
social content sharing sites like Snapchat [1] or Dust [5]
are prominent examples of age-based withdrawal. Several
academic projects also try to enforce age-based withdrawal in
different context; e.g., Vanish [24], [25] in distributed hash
tables (DHTs), EphPub [21] and [37] using DNS caches,
and Ephemerizer [35] and its improvement [34] using trusted
servers. A user’s inability to a priori predict the right time (or
viewership) for her content withdrawal remains to be the key
issue with the age-based withdrawals. This prevents deriving
the best possible content availability.
Mondal et al. [33] suggest inactivity-based withdrawal to
eliminate the burden on the users to decide expiry times and to
facilitate continued discussions around interesting content. Un-
like in age-based withdrawals, where a post is withdrawn after
a predefined time or viewership, in inactivity-based withdrawal
posts can be withdrawn only when it becomes inactive over
time, i.e., it does not generate any more interactions (e.g., shar-
ing the post by other users). Recently proposed Neuralyzer [44]
uses a similar concept to maintain the availability of content
as long as there is sufficient demand for it, and leverages the
caching mechanisms of DNS to keep track of the activity. A
similar idea is also employed on sites like 4chan [3], [28],
where posts are withdrawn as users stop contributing to them
for a prolonged time.
Problems with premeditated withdrawals: No historical
data. The above premeditated withdrawal methodologies
remove every post from the public view eventually; thus, there
is no archived history of user data. However, existence of
archival data can be important to not only the system but also
the users. A recent survey [18] shows that users have a keen
interest in going back to the past social content they have
uploaded, e.g., for reminiscing old memories. Moreover, as
social media sites are often perceived as a mirror of the real
world, reflecting events in the past and how people reacted
to them, archiving the past uploaded content has immense
historical value; e.g., US Library of Congress [2] is already
archiving all uploaded public Twitter data.
Moreover, if a user deletes her post before the predefined
time (or viewership) limit on the post, an adversary can
be certain that it is a user-initiated content deletion. In this
case, the current premeditated schemes provide no privacy or
deniability to the user.
Our Approach. Our challenge is to devise a privacy mech-
anism that offers protection to user-initiated content deletions
(from a persistent onlooker with pervasive access) without
reducing the content’s archival value. We demonstrate how
to achieve these contrasting privacy and availability goals by
systematically withdrawing and resurrecting non-deleted posts
from public view.
III. PROBLEM AND KEY IDEA
A. System and Adversary Model
We model a user-generated data sharing platform (e.g., Twitter)
as a public bulletin board where individuals can upload and/or
view content. Below we define prominent players and their
roles in our setup: Platform is the system, which maintains
the bulletin board (used to upload and view user generated
content); Data Owner is a user who uploads her posts to the
bulletin board. Adversary can view the uploaded posts on the
bulletin board and is constantly in search of posts which have
been deleted by their owners (possibly to scavenge for the
posts that are sensitive to their owners).
In our generic model, all the subscribers (including the
adversary) have complete access to the bulletin board and can
view the posts as they wish. After a data owner decides to
delete a post, the post will be removed from the bulletin board
and will not be visible to anyone. We expect the publisher to
be honest and assist towards achieving the privacy goal.
Our adversary accesses the bulletin board continuously and
takes snapshots at will. He can determine the deleted posts
by comparing the two snapshots taken at different times and
pinpointing the posts that existed in the first one but not
in the second one (the same strategy used to find deleted
tweets in previous studies [31], [33]). The adversary is capable
of adding posts and deleting them from the bulletin board;
however, it will not be able to delete some other users’ posts.
Although the adversary is ultimate in terms of the data access,
given the manual nature of the task of determining sensitive
deletions, his goal will be to flag and analyze as few non-
deleted posts as possible. In the real world, an adversary
would be actually limited in its capability; consequently, all
the privacy guarantees we observe in this work are actually
lower bound (Section 8). Finally, we expect all aspects of our
system and its parameters to be public, and the adversary to
be aware of those.
B. Security Goals
Towards our goal to conceal deletions from the adversary
without significantly affecting the availability, we propose the
following security properties:
Deletion privacy is the uncertainty of the adversary about a
post having been deleted or just temporarily withdrawn by the
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platform at a given point of time. In other words, it is the
deniability of deleting a post for the data owner. As the post
remains down for a longer duration, the adversary becomes
more certain about its deletion, achieving a particular level
of privacy is directly related to having a certain Decision
Threshold on the observed down periods for declaring that
posts are deleted beyond that point.
Platform availability represents the average availability of a
post within a period. The goal is to provide privacy guarantees
to users while obtaining high levels of availability. It is easy
to observe that introducing down periods creates a trade-off
between privacy and availability. For example, assuming the
mean up duration is fixed, as the mean of down distribution in-
creases the availability of the platform will decrease; however,
when a post is deleted, it remains unnoticed to the adversary
for longer periods due to higher decision thresholds.
It is natural to ask why the adversary cannot select his
decision threshold independent of down distribution (and sub-
sequently availability). The answer lies in the difficulty of dis-
tinguishing sensitive posts from non-sensitive ones. Sensitivity
of a post varies from person to person, and also with life events
and time in general, therefore, pinpointing sensitive posts for
each user is a hard task. Moreover, there is a huge discrepancy
between the content creation and deletion rates on social sites
today (social sites are generating new content at the rate around
ten times more than deletions).
This brings us to our third property of adversarial overhead
as we expect our adversary to be concerned with flagging many
non-deleted posts (false positives).
Adversarial overhead. is associated with the number of non-
deleted posts falsely flagged as deleted (false-positives) that
the adversary has to investigate along with the detected actual
deleted posts (true-positives). We capture it by the precision
measure:
Precision =
True Positives
True Positives+ False Positives
.
Towards offering a balanced viewpoint, we also consider
the recall measure capturing false-negatives (i.e., posts that are
flagged as non-deleted but will eventually be deleted):
Recall =
True Positives
True Positives+ False Negatives
.
There is a trade-off between privacy and adversarial over-
head similar to the trade-off between privacy and availability.
Ideally, the adversary overhead should be high which implies
that the precision should be low. If the adversary needs to keep
its overhead low (less false positives), it has to provide better
privacy (deniability) to its victim by increasing its decision
threshold period.
C. Key Idea
We plan to provide privacy for a post deletion by intermittently
withdrawing the non-deleted posts such that the adversary
cannot distinguish between a temporarily withdrawn post and a
permanently deleted post for some long time duration after the
deletion. At its core, our intermittent withdrawal mechanism
consists of choosing alternating up and down periods of ran-
dom durations. This obviously adversely affects the availability
of posts: increasing withdrawal time of a post can improve the
deletion privacy; however, it reduces the overall availability.
Therefore, our key challenge is to determine distributions (and
their parameters) for these intermittent withdrawals such that
we achieve a satisfactory level of deletion privacy without
significantly affecting the availability of the posts.
We illustrate our distributions selection process through the
following two Straw-man proposals.
Straw-man proposal I. As a simple example, consider
the degenerate (or fixed-value) distribution for up and down
duration of a post. With 90% availability in mind, we consider
an alternating series of fixed up period of nine hours and fixed
down period of an hour. Here, every post once withdrawn
remains down for a complete hour. Thus, the adversary cannot
flag a post as deleted until it remains down for more than an
hour as any flagging during the first hour down time cannot
be better than just randomly flagging the posts. However, the
adversary becomes certain about the deletion right after this
one hour of down period. Moreover, if the deletion occurs
sometime during the up period of nine hours, the adversary
can break the privacy immediately.
Although it is possible to increase down time while main-
taining the same availability, the adversary can simply wait
longer before becoming certain about the deletion. Larger
down time may also not be acceptable to platforms expecting
content to be highly available.
Straw-man proposal II. We can replace the above degenerate
distribution by the uniform distribution with mean value of
nine hours for the up distribution and mean value of one hour
for the down distribution. Here, the deletion can happen any-
time during the up duration without the adversary becoming
certain about the deletion. However, the problem with the down
period remains: with the finite support of the down distribution
(two hours for our example), the adversary will be sure about
deletion after two hours.
Towards Lethe. As we do not expect the platform and
the users to accurately predict the waiting time (i.e., decision
threshold) for the adversary, we propose to use the distributions
with infinite support. Here, the adversary can never be certain
about the deletions; but it is easy to see that once the post is
deleted, the adversary becomes more certain about it as time
progresses.
Towards building and analyzing Lethe, we measure privacy
as likelihood ratio in Section IV, and find it to be inversely
proportional to both hazard rate of the up distribution and com-
plementary cumulative distribution of the down distribution.
We measure availability as the ratio of mean up distribution
and sum of means of both (up and down) distributions. In
Section V, we then explore different distributions with infinite
support to select an up and down distribution that offers an
excellent trade-off between deletion privacy, availability and
adversarial overhead. Finally, in Section VI, we evaluate the
system for the estimated Twitter dataset.
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Fig. 1. Timeline of a post. The post is created at time t0, T iu is the
duration of an up phase and T id is the duration of a down phase. In up
phases the post is visible to the adversary, in down phases it is not.
D. Non-goals
While solving this complex problem towards achieving pri-
vacy, we make some simplifying assumptions.
Firstly, we consider all withdrawn posts to be equal, and do
not consider the sensitivity of a post’s content. Several other
studies [29], [30], [38] investigated the sensitivity of posts
in general and resulting privacy leaks. Those studies provide
complementary privacy guarantees and can be used in addition
to our approach.
Secondly, we do not take into account correlations between
posts, and instead, assume individual posts to be independent
in this first proposal for a very difficult problem. Given
extremely unpredictable and context-dependent nature of cor-
relations between posts on social sites, considering correlations
where they are apparent, will be an interesting future work.
Finally, similar to the usage of salting in password hashing
against the dictionary (or rainbow table) attacks, our goal is to
protect the privacy of withdrawn posts on a large scale, and
our adversary scavenges through all the withdrawn posts to
find as many sensitive deletions as possible. We do not aim to
protect against a devoted stalker who stalks a particular user
or post over a long duration. For example, an adversary with
prior knowledge of users (e.g., posting patterns) will have an
advantage that we do not consider. Nevertheless, as compared
to the state-of-the-art, we aim at increasing the workload of
devoted attackers and at delaying the deletion privacy loss at
least by a few arguably important weeks.
IV. PROBLEM FORMALIZATION
A. Formalized Intermittent Withdrawals
In the proposed system, time is discretized in seconds. We
denote by tc the current time. We treat each post independently,
and therefore, the privacy and availability analyses focus on
an individual post. Let t0 denote the creation time of the post.
The intermittent withdrawal mechanism introduces a dis-
connection between the real state of a post (deleted or non-
deleted) and the observed state of the post (publicly visible or
withdrawn). The real state of the post is available only to the
platform and the owner, while the adversary can only see the
observed state of the post.
Real state: Let R(t) denote the real state (either non-deleted
or deleted) of the post at time t. By convention, we say that
R(t) = 1 if the post is not deleted at time t andR(t) = 0 if the
post is deleted. For example, at creation time t0, R(t0) = 1.
We assume that a post cannot be undeleted (or resurrected)
and thus can be deleted only once. Consequently, we define the
deletion time tdel > t0 such that R(t) = 1 for all t ∈ [t0, tdel)
and R(t) = 0 for all t ≥ tdel. We also assume that tdel is not
a choice variable of the platform and remains unknown to the
platform at any time before tdel.
Observable state: At any time t, by accessing the bulletin
board, the adversary or any user only sees if the post is up
(visible) or down (withdrawn). Let O(t) denote this observable
state of the post at time t ≥ t0. By convention, we say that
O(t) = 1 if the post is up and O(t) = 0 if the post is down.
For a post, the platform can decide O(t) for all t0 <
t < tdel. In particular, for each post, the platform chooses
a sequence of positive integer values (T ju)j∈Z+ and (T
j
d )j∈Z+ ,
interpreted as up and down time durations respectively. The
observable state is set as follows.
For all t ∈ [t0, tdel) : (1)
O(t) = 1 if, for some i ≥ 0,
t ∈
[
t0 +
i∑
j=1
T ju +
i∑
j=1
T jd , t0 +
i+1∑
j=1
T ju +
i∑
j=1
T jd
)
;
O(t) = 0 if, for some i ≥ 0,
t ∈
[
t0 +
i+1∑
j=1
T ju +
i∑
j=1
T jd , t0 +
i+1∑
j=1
T ju +
i+1∑
j=1
T jd
)
.
For all t ≥ tdel : O(t) = 0.
Figure 1 illustrates the observable state (from an adver-
sary’s point of view) for a post due to the sequences of up and
down duration. As the deletion time tdel is not known to the
platform at any time before tdel, we can assume without loss
of generality that large sequences (T ju)j∈Z+ and (T
j
d )j∈Z+ are
chosen by the platform at the creation time t0. As a result, the
observable state in Equation (1) can be intuitively interpreted
as follows. The post is initially up and stays up for a duration
T 1u . After the duration T
1
u , it goes down and stays down for a
duration T 1d before coming up again. This process continues
indefinitely until the post is deleted by the owner. Finally, when
a post is deleted, it goes down immediately even if it is in
middle of an up duration, and stays down forever.
Our objective is to control the observable state so that it
becomes difficult for the adversary to be certain about the
deletion of a post. In the proposed intermittent withdrawal
mechanism, (T ju)j∈Z+ and (T
j
d )j∈Z+ are mutually independent
i.i.d. sequences of random variables drawn from probability
mass functions (PMFs) fTu and fTd respectively. We define
the intermittent withdrawal mechanism as follows:
Definition IV.1 (Intermittent withdrawal mechanism). We de-
fine MIW (fTu , fTd) as an algorithm that draws mutually
independent i.i.d. sequences (T ju)j∈Z+ and (T
j
d )j∈Z+ from fTu
and fTd respectively, and sets O(t) as in Equation (1).
As elaborated later in Section V and onwards, We choose
parameters PMFs fTu and fTd of the MIW to satisfy the
contrasting privacy, availability, and adversarial overhead re-
quirements. Throughout the analysis, FTu and FTd represent
the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs), and FTu and FTd
represent the complementary cumulative distribution functions
(CCDFs) of fTu and fTd respectively. We assume that the plat-
form can efficiently sample values from distributions fTu and
fTd , and that these distributions are known to the adversary.
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Next, we formally analyze our security goals in the context
of MIW (fTu , fTd).
B. Deletion Privacy
The notion of deletion privacy should quantify the uncertainty
of the adversary in distinguishing between a post being really
deleted by the owner or just in one of its down durations.
We define this likelihood of adversary detecting an actual
deleted post as the likelihood ratio of the observed sequence of
observable states since post creation conditioned on the post
being deleted or not at the current time tc.
Definition IV.2. For any time tc, we define the privacy of
mechanism MIW (fTu , fTd) as a ratio (LR)
LR =
supt≤tc Pr(OMIW ([t0, tc]) | tdel = t)
supt>tc Pr(OMIW ([t0, tc]) | tdel = t)
, (2)
where OMIW ([t0, tc]) is the observed state for posts due toMIW in the interval [t0, tc].
The above ratio is the classical likelihood ratio (LR) statis-
tic [20] for the test to determine if the post was deleted or not,
i.e., the test with null hypothesis H0 : {R(tc) = 1} (equivalent
to {tdel > tc}) and alternative hypothesis H1 : {R(tc) = 0}
(equivalent to {tdel ≤ tc}). It is known that likelihood ratio
tests have good properties and are often the most powerful tests
that the adversary can do to determine if the post was deleted
[20]. Hence, limiting this likelihood ratio is the best way of
limiting the possibility for the adversary of accurately testing
if the post was deleted or not. Increase in the LR value for a
post denotes increase in certainty of the adversary about a post
deletion; in short, lesser value of LR denotes better privacy.
Since the adversary knows the up and down time distributions
it can compute the likelihood ratio of the deletion privacy.
Our definition of deletion privacy parallels with the definition
of differential privacy [23], however there is subtle difference
between them (Appendix A). In this paper we analyze the
privacy using the Frequentist approach. For interested readers
in the Bayesian analysis we refer to Section 4 of [32].
Deletion Privacy for the Intermittent Withdrawal Mecha-
nism.
As deletion privacy (or LR value) depends on O([t0, tc])
(i.e., the sequence of observable states chosen by the platform)
and consequently on the distributions fTu and fTd , we need
to quantify this dependency to understand the deletion privacy
offered by intermittent withdrawal mechanism.
In our intermittent withdrawal mechanism, up and down
durations are drawn i.i.d. until the post is deleted. Therefore,
Fig. 2. Observing the status of a single post from its creation and precisely
looking at the last up and down duration, ∆tu and ∆td respectively. tc
is the current time, tiu denotes the last up toggle and similarly tid is the
last down toggle time.
the probability of the sequence is the product of probability
of observing each duration which is the same regardless of if
the post was deleted or not except for the last up and down
durations; one of the last up and down durations could be cut
by the deletion. As a result, the ratio LR depends only on
the last up and down durations. We denote last up and down
duration by ∆tu and ∆td respectively and by extension by
O(∆tu,∆td) the observed state in those times (see illustration
on Figure 2). Then the likelihood ratio on the lhs of (2) can
be simplified as
LR =
supt≤tc Pr(O(∆tu,∆td) | tdel = t)
supt>tc Pr(O(∆tu,∆td) | tdel = t)
. (3)
Now we compute the numerator and denominator sepa-
rately. The denominator is simply the likelihood of observing
O(∆tu,∆td) if the post was not yet deleted at time tc (i.e.,
R(tc) = 1), which is
Pr(O(∆tu,∆td) | R(tc) = 1) = fTu(∆tu) · FTd(∆td − 1).
(4)
As the post has not been deleted at time tc (i.e.,R(tc) = 1), the
probability of observing ∆tu is fTu(∆tu). Moreover, since the
post is in middle of a down period the probability of observing
∆td is Pr(T id ≥ ∆td) = FTd(∆td − 1).
For the numerator, we compute the probability of
O(∆tu,∆td) conditioned on the deletion time being t for each
t between the last toggle tid and the current time tc and take the
maximum of those probabilities. (It is not necessary to consider
earlier deletion times since the probability of O(∆tu,∆td)
would then be zero.) We treat separately the case where
tdel = t
i
d which corresponds to a deletion happening during (or
at the end of) an up period and the cases tdel ∈ (tid, tc] which
correspond to a deletion happening during a down period. In
the second case, for t ∈ (tid, tc], we have
Pr(O(∆tu,∆td) | tdel = t) = fTu(∆tu) · FTd(t− tid − 1),
which is maximized for t = tid + 1 where FTd(t − tid − 1) =
FTd(0) = 1. In the case where tdel = t
i
d, then the last up period
could have been either of exactly ∆tu or of more, hence
Pr(O(∆tu,∆td) | tdel = tid) = FTu(∆tu) + fTu(∆tu).
Since FTu(∆tu) ≥ 0, we conclude that
sup
t≤tc
Pr(O(∆tu,∆td) | tdel = t) = FTu(∆tu) + fTu(∆tu).
(5)
Substituting (4) and (5) into (3), we get the final expression
of the likelihood ratio:
LR =
(
FTu(∆tu)
fTu(∆tu)
+ 1
)
· 1
FTd(∆td − 1)
. (6)
Equation (6) captures the relation between the LR (i.e.,
deletion privacy) and the choice of up and down time distribu-
tions: (i) the LR is (almost) inversely proportional to the hazard
rate fTu(∆tu)/FTu(∆tu) of the up distribution; and (ii) the
LR is inversely proportional to the CCDF FTd(∆td−1) of the
down distribution. We need to optimize for these two functions
while choosing up and down time distributions for controlling
privacy guarantee of MIW .
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C. Availability property
The intermittent withdrawal mechanism provides deletion pri-
vacy at the cost of reducing availability of the post. The post
is not visible to the adversary as well as any benign observer
during the down periods. Intuitively, the availability of a post
is simply the fraction of time the post is visible to an observer.
Formally, for mechanism MIW (fTu , fTd) the availability is:
Availability =
µfTu
µfTu + µfTd
, (7)
where µfTu is the mean of the up time distribution fTu and
µfTu is the mean of the down time distribution fTd .
The LR (6) and availability (7), both are functions of the
up and down time distributions and thus are correlated. For
instance, when posts in the archive are always down (e.g., fTu
is a finite distribution and fTd is a distribution with infinite
mean), the archive has zero availability and perfect privacy (the
LR value is 1). On the other hand, when posts in the archive are
always up (e.g., fTd is a uniform distribution with mean 0), the
archive has perfect availability of 1 and no privacy (LR value is
∞). In non-extreme cases, the relationship of availability and
privacy is more intricate and depends on specific choices of up
and down distributions. We explore this trade-off empirically
in Section VI.
V. Lethe DESIGN
We parameterized the security guarantees in section IV, but we
still need to determine exact specifications for these parameters
to effectively control the guarantees. The required parameters
include the mean up (down) times for the up (down) distribu-
tions as well as choices of PMFs for those distributions. The
key design challenge for Lethe is: How to choose suitable
parameters for Lethe to give good availability and privacy
guarantees? Here, we resolve this design challenge empiri-
cally.
A. Choosing up/down distribution mean values to control
availability
Availability of Lethe , the average fraction of up time, depends
upon the mean for up and down distributions (Equation (7)).
While choosing mean values of up and down time distributions,
the platform operator needs to decide upon the required
availability of the platform. From a practical perspective, we
envision that the platform would need the availability to be
around 90%.
The absolute value of the down time is also interesting from
a usability viewpoint: Hypothetically if an operator expecting
90% availability sets the mean down time as one year and
mean up time as nine years, a particular post will be hidden on
average for one year. However, a year of down time on average
is unacceptable in many real-world scenarios: the users may
leave the system if the non-deleted content is not available for
such large durations. Therefore, unless otherwise stated, we
set mean for down time distributions as one hour and mean
for up time distributions as nine hours.
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Fig. 3. Variation of inverse hazard rate with time for four choices of
up time distributions (with same mean). Increase in inverse hazard rate
signifies increase in LR value.
B. Choosing up/down distribution PMFs to control deletion
privacy
The platform operator needs to control the deletion privacy
guarantee of Lethe via setting some suitable choices for up
and down time distributions (i.e., their PMFs). Her aim is to
minimize the LR value.
Geometric distribution is a suitable choice for up time
distribution. Recall that the value of LR, is inversely
proportional to the hazard rate for the up time distribution
(Equation (6)) at the last up duration. To select the up
times distribution, we considered a wide range of distributions
varying in their main characteristics and we present here four
distributions with infinite support and the same mean of nine
hours—zeta, poisson, geometric and negative binomial [40]—
that illustrate the main rationales behind our choice. Figure 3
shows the inverse hazard rate for these four choices of up time
distributions for different values of last up durations (ranging
up to 24 hours). The trends remain similar for longer time
durations. Note that, negative binomial distribution requires
a parameter called the shape parameter or n, which is set to
0.15 in Figure 3 for demonstration. The take away in this figure
remains the same for other values of n. The key observation is
that only the memoryless geometric distribution has a constant
inverse hazard rate for different last up durations. If we take
geometric distribution as our up time distribution function, any
value of last up duration will have the same effect on the value
of LR, i.e., the value of LR will not be affected even when a
deletion happens in middle of an up duration (and effectively
cut short the original up duration).
However, this is not the case for other distributions—
their inverse hazard rate changes with the value of last up
duration. Thus, aside from geometric distribution, any other
choice of up time distributions poses two problems: (i) the
inverse hazard rate (and consequently LR value) would be
very high at some point for the last up duration, as evident
from Figure 3 and (ii) if a post is deleted in the middle
of last up duration the LR value will change for that post
(since deletion effectively changes the original value of last up
duration) compare to the case of no deletion. This phenomenon
might provide additional hint to the attacker. Thus we strongly
prescribe to use geometric distribution as a suitable choice of
up time distribution.
We note that our choice is conservative—for other distri-
butions, there will be instances where inverse hazard rate (and
subsequently the LR value) is lower compare to geometric
distribution (see Figure 3). However, we prefer predictability
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Fig. 4. Variation of inverse of CCDF values in log scaled (proportional
to value of LR) for down distribution with last down duration for four
choices of down distributions.
in the inverse hazard rate of geometric distribution (thus value
of LR) for a deployment.
Negative binomial distribution is a suitable choice for down
time distribution. Similar to up time distribution analysis,
we have experimented with a wide range of distributions for
down times. Recall that the LR value, is proportional to the
inverse CCDF of a given down time distribution (Equation (6))
Figure 4 presents the inverse of CCDF of down time dis-
tribution in log scale for different values of last down time
duration (ranging up to 24 hours) for our four representative
choices—zeta, geometric, Poisson and negative binomial [40]
(each with a mean of one hour). The trends remain similar
for longer time durations. We first observe that for a small
down duration, the Poisson distribution has the lowest inverse
CCDF value (thus lowest LR). However, at the mean down
duration, the value quickly jumps and becomes the highest
amongst the different distributions tested. The reason is that
most values in the Poisson distribution are concentrated around
the mean. Hence, before the mean, the CCDF is close to 1 but
quickly after the mean it becomes close to zero (intuitively,
for Poisson distribution there is a negligible chance that a non-
deleted post observes a down time much larger than the mean;
thus observing one gives a very strong signal to the attacker).
Similarly, any other distribution with value concentrated
around a mode would suffer the same limitation and it is
preferable to select a distribution with a decreasing PMF such
as geometric, zeta or negative binomial. Amongst those three,
geometric has lowest LR for small down time durations, but
it increases rapidly for large down time durations. Compara-
tively, zeta has higher LR for small down time durations and
smaller values for large down time duration. This difference
is because the geometric distribution has a light tail and
its PMF decreases faster whereas the zeta distribution has a
heavy tail and therefore assigns higher weights to very large
values–hence observing even a very large value has a non-
negligible probability to happen under no deletion if the down
time distribution is zeta. Finally, the key observation from
Figure 4 is that the inverse CCDF value of negative binomial
distribution provides a balance between these two patterns and
thus presents itself as a nice choice for down time distribution.
However, there is a challenge while using negative bino-
mial distribution: it takes another parameter (in addition to
mean down time), called the shape parameter and denoted “n”.
In Figure 4, n is set to 0.15 for demonstrating trends, but a
practical deployment of Lethe requires a systematic guideline
for setting n. Specifically, if the platform operator can have
an estimate θ∗ for adversary’s decision threshold, then it can
choose n such that the value of LR is lowest for decision
threshold θ∗. The platform operator may even base θ∗ on user
perception, e.g., operator decides that it is ok, if an adversary
finds out deletion of a post after six months or more.
As evident in Figure 4, zeta distribution will outperform
negative binomial distribution at some point in time. However,
we claim that for all the decision thresholds that we have
considered (even years), there exists a shape parameter for the
negative binomial distribution that provides lower LR value for
that threshold compared to zeta distribution. On the other hand,
if the platform cannot come up with any reasonable θ∗ it might
use zeta distribution, since eventually it will perform better
than negative binomial distribution; however, this comes at the
cost of lowering privacy, i.e., increased LR value, for some
period of time. In general, we expect the platform operators,
based on their experience, to estimate the range of decision
threshold θ∗ values reasonably well.
We discuss a procedure to calculate the value of the shape
parameter (n) of negative binomial distribution (given the
mean down time and the adversary’s decision threshold) and
its effect on the LR value in Appendix B.
C. Lethe Algorithm
Input: platform availability percentage, mean down time, ad-
versary’s decision threshold.
Algorithm:
1) Acquire the mean up time based on the provided mean
down time and availability values.
2) Obtain the shape parameter using the derivative procedure
based on Equation (8) using the mean down time and
decision threshold from input.
3) Initialize the up and down distributions by passing the
mean up and down times along with the shape parameter
for the down distribution.
4) Upon a post creation, set the real state of the post to 1
and instantiate the first up period from the up distribution.
Set observable state of the post to 1.
5) Upon a toggle signal for a post, if the post was in
a up period instantiate a down period from the down
distribution and set the observable state to zero; Otherwise
instantiate an up period from the up distribution and set
the observable state to one.
6) Upon a deletion request for a post from the owner, set
the real and observable state to zero and remove the post
from the active set (i.e. posts that toggle).
These steps provide a platform operator the basic algorithm
to run Lethe . However, from a system design point of view
a relevant question is—how to efficiently implement these
steps? For example, a simple but inefficient (not scalable)
implementation for the platform is to just assign one process
per post to track the observable state for that post (which
is toggled due to Lethe). We find that pre-computing future
up and down durations and updating them lazily results in
efficient Lethe implementation. We direct interested readers
to Appendix B for an efficient Lethe implementation sketch.
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VI. EVALUATION OF Lethe
We evaluate the usefulness of Lethe by answering a key
question: In practice, how hard is it for an adversary to detect
deleted posts in presence of Lethe (adversarial overhead for
identifying deleted posts)?
The posts, which are deleted by the users, will be in a down
period for an infinite time. Thus, the down period of such posts
will at some point exceed the adversarially chosen decision
threshold θ (associated with the LR values) and be flagged
by the adversary. These deleted posts, once correctly flagged
by an adversary, constitute the true-positives TPθ. Conversely,
when a down period T id for some non-deleted posts exceed
the decision threshold, these falsely flagged posts constitute
the false positives FPθ. On the other hand, the posts that are
flagged as non-deleted but will eventually be deleted will be
the false negatives FNθ.
Thus, for a decision threshold θ set by our adversary, if
his strategy gives the TPθ, FPθ and FNθ, we measure the
adversarial overhead as the precision Precisionθ = TPθTPθ+FPθ
and the recall Recallθ = TPθTPθ+FNθ .
To evaluate usefulness of Lethe we empirically explore the
relation between adversarial precision, availability and decision
threshold set by the adversary.
Data Collection: Today, such an intermittent withdrawal
mechanism does not exist in the domain of social media and
archives. To evaluate the feasibility and performance of Lethe ,
we take Twitter data as a good model platform. To that end,
we need numbers for non-deleted and deleted posts on Twitter,
and the rate of deletion and new tweets addition in Twitter.
Using reports such as [13], [14], we estimate that there are
one trillion non-deleted tweets in the Twitter platform as of
2015. To determine the rates of deletion/addition of tweets,
we resort to the 1% random sample provided by Twitter [12].
Specifically, we collected 1% random sample for 18 months
(from October 2015 to April 2017). In our 1% random sample,
daily on average, 3.2 million tweets are created, i.e. in the
whole Twitter 320 million new tweets are created daily.
Further, the 1% sample also provides us deletion notices; using
those notices we determine how many of archived tweets are
deleted daily [16]. We found that on average around 1 million
tweets are deleted daily from 1% sample. So daily, on average
100 million tweets are deleted from the whole Twitter archive.
Thus, the ratio between the volume of deleted and non-deleted
tweets in the Twitter platform is approximately 0.01%. As
time passes, this ratio will become smaller (assuming deletion
volume will not change too much). Finally, daily 220 million
non-deleted tweets are added to the archive.
Experimental setup: For our experiment, we set 1 day as our
time unit and pick three system availabilities to experiment—
85%, 90% and 95%, all with the mean down time of one
hour. Consequently, for 85%, 90% and 95% availability the
mean up times are respectively 5.7, 9 and 19 hours. Next,
we set the up and down time distributions as geometric and
negative binomial respectively (as discussed in Section V). We
use Table III to set the shape parameter n for our negative
binomial distribution.
To make the Lethe simulation feasible with our available
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Fig. 5. CCDF value of up and down durations. The up distribution is a
geometric distribution with the mean of 9 hours. The down distribution
is a negative binomial distribution with the mean of 1 hour.
resources, we scale down the absolute numbers of deleted/non-
deleted tweets to 0.01% of their original values. In other words,
we simulate Lethe on a scaled down version of Twitter (our
archival platform). We consider that our platform contains
100 million non-deleted tweets (0.01% of 1 trillion) already
archived in the platform Moreover, 32k tweets are created each
day and 10k tweets are deleted (thus adding 22k non-deleted
tweets each day) in our platform.
Experimental methodology: For the evaluation of Lethe we
take the Frequentist design explained in Sections IV-B and V.
We note that in order to simulate Lethe we don’t need the
exact timestamps for each post creation and deletion. Lethe is
applied to the posts as if all of them were created on the first
day of experiment. We take 1 day as our time unit and for our
simulation, we assume that creation and deletion notifications
are received in batch in every time unit. We continue this
experiment for 10 years (considering creation and deletion of
tweets each day). Figure 5 presents the CCDF value of the
up and down durations for the chosen distributions at the 90%
availability. More than 99% of the down durations are less than
or equal to one minute. The mean up duration in Figure 5 is 9
hours and more than 90% of the up durations are longer than
3 hours.
Leveraging our aforementioned experimental set-up we
simulate Lethe and measure adversarial overhead (i.e. pre-
cision and recall) at different decision thresholds. In our set
up the true positive for the adversary is simply: number of
daily deletions × (experiment duration - decision threshold).
The false positives for our adversary, on the other hand, are
non-deleted tweets that get flagged based on the adversary’s
decision threshold. Further, we note that our adversary might
decide to flag the false positives either once or multiple times
(i.e., remove flag from a tweet when the tweet is resurrected
after a long time and again flag it later). We consider these
two scenarios separately.
Adversary investigates a flagged tweet only once: In this
scenario, if a non-deleted post gets flagged the adversary will
investigate it and after its investigation, it will remove that
tweet from his consideration. Thus, the adversary will not
consider the post again in the future, even though the post
is visible again. We call this scenario flag-once. Figure 6 is
showing the variation of adversarial precision for different de-
cision thresholds in X-axis. As the decision threshold increases
the adversary’s confidence about a tweet being deleted also
increases which result in higher precision values. Note that
even for 85% and 90% platform availability the adversarial
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Fig. 7. Variation of adversarial recall against decision threshold periods
for different availability values in flag-once scenario.
precision is around (or less than) 35% even when the decision
threshold is as high as six months or 180 days , i.e., due to
Lethe a deletion will go unnoticed for as long as six months.
This scenario checks a flagged post only once and will not
consider it later again. Thus, it is possible that a non-deleted
post flagged at time t will actually be deleted at a time later
than t. So some posts might be deleted but not considered by
the adversary, introducing false negatives. Figure 7 shows the
variation of adversarial recall of deleted posts for different
decision thresholds in X-axis. We make two observations.
First, the adversary’s recall increases with decision threshold.
This is because, with increasing threshold, tweets that are not
deleted at time t (but deleted later) will have more time to
become visible (not getting flagged) before their actual time of
deletion. Second, the recall increases with system availability.
The reason is that the number of down periods decreases with
increasing system availabilities and thus it is less likely to
obtain larger down periods to flag tweets. This results in higher
recall.
Adversary investigates a flagged tweet multiple times: This
scenario is opposite of the previous one in the sense that once
a non-deleted tweet has been flagged and investigated it will
return to the set of non-deleted. We call this scenario flag-
multi. The rationality behind this scenario is: it is true that the
falsely flagged tweets are not deleted at the current time, but
they might be at a future point in time, since sensitivity changes
with time and life events. Thus the adversary would also like to
take into consideration the real deletion of false positive tweets.
Figure 8 shows the adversarial precision with varying decision
thresholds. Compared to the scenario in Figure 6 the adversary
has a lower precision for different thresholds for all values of
platform availability. The reason is, in this case, a tweet can
be flagged multiple times and result in higher false positives.
Specifically, in Figure 8, for the case of 90% availability,
Lethe keeps adversarial precision around 20% even when the
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periods for different availability values in flag-multi scenario. In this
scenario a tweet can be falsely flagged multiple times.
adversary’s decision threshold is as high as 6 months.
In this scenario if a post is flagged it can again be
considered for investigation. Since, a deleted post will remain
in a down period forever, the adversary will flag it as soon as
the decision threshold is over. Thus, all the deletions will be
identified eventually. Consequently, in this case there are no
type II errors (false negatives) and recall will always be 100%.
Overhead of investigating falsely flagged tweets: Finally,
we address one aspect of Lethe that we did not consider so
far: the astronomical number of falsely flagged tweets that
an adversary has to investigate (i.e., extra work) in either
of these scenarios. Table I presents the raw number of non-
deleted tweets falsely flagged (i.e. false positives) for both of
the aforementioned scenarios. In the worst case, the adversary
falsely flagged 13 trillion tweets in the flag-multi scenario
when the availability and decision threshold are respectively
85% and 30 days. As Table I shows, even in the best case, with
95% availability and 180 day decision threshold in the flag-
once scenario, the adversary needs to investigate 340 billion
falsely flagged tweets.
We have also considered one extreme case—setting the
platform availability to 99% (results not shown), i.e., setting
the mean down and up time respectively to 1 hour and 99
hours. Although the precision, in that case, is higher compared
to the ones in Figure 6 and 8, we found that even with 99%
availability, in the best case (decision threshold 6 months, flag-
once scenario) the adversary still needs to investigate 70 billion
falsely flagged tweets. In short, We emphasize that the number
of falsely flagged tweets is astronomical, and without incurring
very high infrastructural cost an adversary can not support
such investigation. Thus, much higher decision thresholds are
needed for the adversary.
Note that, if an adversary targets a subset of all users, then
precision/recall values for both scenarios remain the same and
it will only proportionately effect actual number of falsely
flagged tweets mentioned in Table I. For example, if the
adversary is targeting 0.1% of all the users then number of
falsely flagged tweets in Table I will be in billions instead of
trillions. Furthermore, as the number of users decreases, the
prior knowledge of the adversary about the deletion patterns
of the users becomes more precise. This advantage results in
a more accurate adversarial model that lowers the privacy of
the users.
10
#FFT (in trillions) for
flag-once scenario and
diff availability %
#FFT (in trillions) for
flag-multi scenario and
diff availability %
DT
(days) 85% 90% 95% 85% 90% 95%
30 1.64 1.54 1.23 13.05 8.7 4.35
60 1.45 1.24 0.83 6.39 4.26 2.13
90 1.25 1.01 0.62 4.18 2.78 1.39
120 1.09 0.84 0.48 3.07 2.04 1.02
150 0.95 0.71 0.40 2.40 1.60 0.80
180 0.84 0.61 0.34 1.96 1.30 0.65
TABLE I. FALSELY FLAGGED TWEETS (FFT) WITH DIFFERENT
AVAILABILITIES, WHICH THE ADVERSARY NEEDS TO INVESTIGATE UNDER
DIFFERENT SCENARIOS. DT DENOTES DECISION THRESHOLD.
VII. EFFECT OF Lethe IN PRACTICE
Platforms would like to make sure that their users are able
to normally interact with the content they want and thus
utility of their system is preserved when Lethe is in place.
This guarantee differs from availability since even with 99%
availability, the 1% non-available content might be the ones
users are interested in. We identify one key factor that captures
the distinction between availability and utility—the interaction
with content in many platforms go down with time passing.
E.g., [9], [39] shows that tweets receive more than 60% of
their retweets and replies within the first hour of posting and
it quickly becomes negligible as time passes. Thus, in this
section we investigate how Lethe preserves the utility and not
hinder the normal platform operations.
A. Quantifying utility of a platform
In order to evaluate the effect on utility in a real world scenario,
we leverage data from Twitter. But first, we need to concretely
define the utility of each post as well as the utility of the
platform in the context of Twitter.
Utility of a post and of the platform: We take “retweets” as
a proxy for interactions (temporal utility) around a tweet. We
quantitatively measure the collective utility of the platform to
be the fraction of retweets allowed when Lethe is in place.
Although retweets are only a subset of all interactions (other
interactions might be replies or user mentions) and may not
capture the entirety of interactions, it is still one of the widely
employed proxies of activity around a tweet [19], [22], [33].
Collecting a utility dataset: We need to ensure that Lethe
preserves utility for all normal users of our system. To create
a collective random sample of such users, we first take all
the users who appeared in the 1% random Twitter sample
collected in the first week of November 2011. Then we divide
the users into five exponential buckets based on their number
of followers (i.e. by their popularity) and randomly sampled
500 users from each bucket. We did this subsampling in mid-
February 2016. Thus we end up with 2,500 random users.
We collected all the tweets posted by these users (respecting
Twitter’s limit of 3200 most recent tweets per user) and all
the retweets of those tweets on end of February 2016. Out of
2,500, 6 users have made their account private between the
time of subsampling and the time of all-tweets collection. So
we end up collecting data from rest of the 2,494 users. There
are a total of 4,858,014 tweets in our dataset. Among them
Availability
Decision
Threshold (days) 85% 90% 95%
30 99.25 99.50 99.76
60 99.46 99.66 99.83
90 99.55 99.72 99.87
120 99.61 99.76 99.89
150 99.63 99.79 99.90
180 99.68 99.82 99.91
TABLE II. UTILITY FOR TWITTER IN PRESENCE OF Lethe OPERATING
WITH DIFFERENT AVAILABILITIES AND DIFFERENT DECISION
THRESHOLDS. IN ALL CASES THE UTILITY OF THE SYSTEM IS ABOVE 99%,
AND AS THE AVAILABILITY INCREASES THE UTILITY INCREASES.
there are 730,055 tweets with at least one retweet and these
tweets have 8,836,706 retweets in total. We use this dataset to
check the Lethe’s effect on platform utility.
B. How does Lethe affect utility?
We simulate Lethe on our utility dataset with the following
set-up for Lethe’s parameters.
Setup for measuring utility in presence of Lethe: We have
experimented with setting the platform availability to 85%,
90% and 95%. We again set the mean down time to 1 hour and
set mean up times to satisfy the availability requirements. The
up and down distributions are geometric and negative binomial
respectively. Recall that the negative binomial distribution
needs a shape parameter along with the mean. Although we are
not considering the adversary in the utility experiment, to be
consistent with the privacy analysis, we repeat the experiment
for the shape parameters from Table III.
Specifically, we simulate Lethe for each of the posts in our
utility dataset. Note that, an original retweet happening in a
down duration (i.e., when the tweet is hidden) is essentially
missed and thus platform utility is affected. However, retweets
happening in an up duration essentially remain unaffected. We
count all the retweets that would have been missed if Lethe
was in place and calculate the fraction of retweets missed due
to Lethe . Note that, here we do not consider the effect of
missed retweets on future retweets, modeling such effect are
part of our future work. Finally, the utility of our system will
be simply 1 - fraction of retweets missed.
Lethe has minimal effect on system utility: Table II shows
the utility of the platform in presence of Lethe with vary-
ing decision thresholds (for each of them the optimal shape
parameter is used). The table is showing the utility, i.e., the
fraction of retweets allowed, for 85, 90 and 95% availability.
For each of the availabilities, we have chosen six different
decision thresholds with their corresponding shape parameter
from Table III. The key observation is: for all the cases the
utility is quite high. Difference between the utilities are at
most 0.5% for different availabilities, and if 99% utility is
sufficient for the platform, the platform can simply choose
85% availability over 95% to provide better privacy to the
users while maintaining utility.
In summary, Lethe can indeed hide deletion of users while
having minimal effect on platform utility. For a successful
Lethe deployment, even 85% or less availability might provide
a good trade off between privacy, availability, adversarial
overhead and platform utility.
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VIII. ENHANCEMENTS AND DISCUSSION
Real-world restricted adversary. In this work, we considered
an adversary that can consistently observe each and every post
of our platform and has full access to the Lethe up/down
distribution parameters. However, a real-world adversary will
have a much more restricted view of the platform (e.g.,
Twitter normally allows the developers to collect only 1%
random sample of their data) or even of the Lethe deployment
(e.g., the adversary has to estimate the exact parameters of
up/down distribution). Further, in the real world, non-state-
level adversaries will be severely limited by computing power
and memory. Hence a possible extension of Lethe is to restrict
the adversary model (i.e., capabilities of the adversary) with
practical restrictions on the adversary’s resources and consider-
ing the estimation overhead of Lethe parameters. The privacy
guarantees provided by Lethe will significantly improve for
such restricted, real-world adversaries.
Providing privacy guarantees based on users’ needs. We
note that by choosing different up/down time distributions, a
platform operator can provide a range of privacy guarantees
for Lethe . For example, if a user needs privacy specifically for
2 or 3 days (e.g., during an uprising) then the system operator
can provide short-term privacy by choosing appropriate distri-
butions (where LR value is very low for a short term, then
increase rapidly). On the other hand, some celebrity might
want long term privacy, where the privacy guarantee is not
very high, but it is relatively stable over time. In other words,
another possible extension will be to match users’ need for
privacy by simply tweaking the parameters and distributions
in Lethe . The privacy guarantees can further be improved in
case a user does not mind deleting their content only in down
periods. Recall that, we choose geometric distribution as a
suitable up distribution primarily since it enables the users to
delete their content in both up and down time durations without
any effect on the privacy. In case post deletions are restricted
only to down durations, we can also explore other choices for
up distributions.
Will six month be sufficient?. Lethe provides plausible
deniability guarantees for a deletion even after 3 to 6 months
of deletion. We argue that delaying an adversary 3 to 6 months
to detect deletions might be sufficient in many scenarios. The
reason is twofold: (i) Recent work [27] modeled users of
social platforms as limited memory information processing
actors; these actors care less and less about old information.
In fact, this model is supported by the phenomena that almost
all large social media sites today show the posts in reverse
chronologically. (ii) Usually, curious people may focus on
some specific user’s posts related to some offline (i.e., physical
work) event (e.g., in the case of the SNL cast member [6], it
was her joining the SNL); however due to the very same reason
the user in focus might decide to delete her posts at that time.
If Lethe can delay the revelation of this deletion even for a
few days, it should be sufficient to dissuade the observers.
Opt-outs and Delayed Execution. In some cases, users wish
to maintain uninterrupted availability of some of their posts
infinitely (e.g., pinned tweets on Twitter) or for the first few
days. Lethe can easily skip such posts specifically marked by
the user. Although these posts do not affect privacy and only
improve availability, they can improve adversarial precision:
such posts are hardly deleted and thus, their continuous pres-
ence will result in lesser false positives. Nevertheless, given
the very high utility provided by Lethe, we expect the number
of such posts to remain limited.
Deception for Intrusion Detection and Surveillance Sys-
tems. Lethe can have interesting applicability beyond the
content deletion scenario. Consider an intrusion detection or
surveillance system that continuously monitors accesses to a
system. Assume an intruder with a side channel that allows him
to determine if the system is not functioning for maintenance,
power outage or crash. The intruder wishes to exploit this side
channel to attack the system; nevertheless, the attack might be
time-consuming, and the stakes can be very high such that he
does not like to get caught in action. Lethe’s approach can be
used in this context as a deceptive technology, deterring the
intruder even when the system goes down. It will be confusing
for the intruder as it cannot determine if the system is in a sleep
mode due to Lethe or has crashed. Interestingly, this approach
will also be helpful towards making the surveillance system
energy-efficient as it will not have to be online and operate
constantly.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In the world with perfect and permanent memory, we are in
dire need of mechanisms to restore the ability to forget. Against
an adversary who can persistently observe a user’s data, the
user’s deletions make her more vulnerable by directly pointing
the adversary to sensitive information. In this work, we have
defined, formalized, and addressed this problem by designing
Lethe .
In particular, we have formally defined a novel intermittent
withdrawal mechanism, quantified its privacy, availability, and
adversarial overhead guarantees in the form of a tradeoff. We
leverage this mechanism to design Lethe which provides users
deniability for their deletions while having very little impact on
the system availability against an extremely powerful adversary
having complete knowledge about the archival platform. Still,
even in the case of such an adversary, leveraging real-world
data we have demonstrated the efficacy of Lethe in provid-
ing a good tradeoff between privacy, availability, adversarial
overhead and platform utility. For example, we have shown
that while maintaining 95% availability and utility as high as
99.7%, we can offer deletion privacy for up to 3 months from
the time of deletion while still keeping the adversarial precision
to 20%.
Our work takes first few prominent steps towards solving
the multi-faceted problem of forgetting the forgotten, while
several interesting challenges remain. One future challenge is
to consider deletion of correlated posts. Another challenge is
to handle concrete deployment issues for Lethe , e.g., how to
synchronize hiding/unhiding processes between geo-replicated
data stores? To conclude, we believe our work calls for further
research into these issues in order to provide users a more
private right to be forgotten.
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APPENDIX
A. Difference between Deletion Privacy & Differential Privacy
Our notion of deletion privacy has parallels with differential
privacy [23] in that we consider the ratio of likelihood of
observed states, but there is also a subtle difference. The
privacy parameter defined in Definition IV.2 depends on the
specific observed states O. This is in contrast with differential
privacy where the relevant ratio e (for the parameter ) is
defined as a worst-case bound for all possible observations.
The reason for choosing this definition instead of differential
privacy is that it is not possible to find a meaningful bound
on the ratio in Equation (2) valid for all observations: as time-
since-deletion increases, the adversary becomes more certain
about deletion. In short we can interpret our deletion privacy
definition as a way to capture the certainty of an adversary for
detecting post deletion with his observed states over time.
B. Effect of Negative Binomial Shape Parameter
What is a suitable shape parameter for negative binomial
distribution? We present an analytical approach to set an
optimal n, given platform operator’s estimate of decision
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Estimate of decision
threshold is θ∗ days 30 60 90 120 150 180
Shape parameter n
for lowest LR ×10−4 6 3 2 1.5 1.2 1
TABLE III. THE BEST SHAPE PARAMETER n I.E. THE LOWEST LR
VALUE WHEN THE ESTIMATED DECISION THRESHOLD FOR THE
ADVERSARY IS θ∗ DAYS. THE MEAN OF OUR NEGATIVE BINOMIAL
DISTRIBUTION IS ONE HOUR.
threshold θ∗. Since we set the up time distribution as geometric
distribution with a constant inverse hazard rate (which we will
denote by “c”), Equation (6) becomes
LR =
c+ 1
FTd(∆td − 1)
.
Ideally, the platform operator should set n such that, when
the adversary’s decision threshold is θ∗ (i.e., the adversary
flags a post as deleted after not observing the post for time θ∗
or more), the post has the lowest LR value. In other words,
LR value should be lowest when the last down duration is θ∗.
Thus, by deciding negative binomial distribution with mean
µd and shape parameter n, we would want FTd(∆td − 1) to
reach a maximum at ∆td = θ∗. Thus, we take the derivative
of FTd(∆td−1) with respect to shape parameter n and equate
it to 0 at ∆td = θ∗, i.e.,
∂
∂n
FTd(θ
∗ − 1) = ∂
∂n
I(
1−n 1−µdµd
)(θ∗, n) = 0 (8)
where Ix(a, b) is the incomplete beta integral. Now setting
µd = 1 hour, we solve for n to determine the best shape
parameter for a given value of θ∗.
Table III shows the best shape parameters for different
values of θ∗. An archive operator can choose any of these
values according to her choice of θ∗ or even calculate suitable
values of n for her estimated θ∗ using our analytical technique.
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Fig. 9. Variation of LR for zeta distribution and three choices of shape
parameters for the negative binomial distribution. The x-axis is showing
the last down duration in months and y-axis is showing the LR value in
log scaled. The lowest LR value for each of the decision thresholds in table
III is for the corresponding shape parameter. Choosing negative binomial
distribution with any of the parameters for the given down durations
results lower LR values then choosing zeta as the down distribution.
Effect of Negative binomial Shape Parameter on LR value:
Furthermore, in Figure 9, we demonstrate how parameter n
impacts the LR value by plotting the LR for some of the
shape parameters in table III (corresponding to θ∗ 1, 2 and 6
months). We have set the mean up and down time to nine and
one hours respectively. As evident there is no shape parameter
that performs best for all the times, however, we can observe
that for each of the decision thresholds θ∗ in Table III the
corresponding shape parameter has the lowest LR value. We
also observe that for all the chosen parameters, LR value for
negative binomial is lower than the case of picking zeta as
down distribution.
In section V we presented the basic steps of Lethe . However
in our paper we considered that Lethe should be applied
to each single post. So a very pratical question is: How to
efficiently implement Lethe in a platform? Here we provide a
brief implementation sketch.
Basic setup for a platform. We assume a generic archival
platform where each post is stored as an Active Store Object
(ASO) [26]. ASOs are simply key-value pairs with some
(optional) code to run on values. Traditionally this ASO code
is written in terms of handlers (e.g., code to handle deletion).
Each post ASO will have an unique post id as key, the user
generated post content as value, identification of the owner (as
authentication token) and some metadata (e.g., the real state
flag for a post). We further assume that there is an internal
trusted time server, which is used throughout the platform
for synchronizing operations. The platform internally does not
use any other timestamps. Any mention of timestamps in this
section refers to this internal timestamp. Extending this set-up
to traditional databases is simple and left to future work.
We use an architecture similar to Comet [26], where the
platform operator as well as platform users (including adver-
sary) have some specific Application Programmer Interfaces
(API) to access/create/delete the posts. However note that in
our adversary model, the adversary can just query the posts
and can not change them in any way. Thus, unlike Comet in
Lethe post ASO objects are immutable from the point of view
of an adversary.
Straw man implementation. A straightforward implemen-
tation of Lethe is to add an “observable state” flag (binary)
with meta data of each post ASO. Whenever a post is created,
the platform operator assigns a process (or a thread) to the
post. That process will apply Lethe algorithm to toggle the
observable state. In case of a view request, another user
initiated process will seek the required ASO or ASOs, check
the “observable state” flag and return a post if the post is
observable (i.e., observable state flag is TRUE). However, this
design if definitely not scalable for a platform with billions of
posts. Thus we need an improved implementation.
Key insight. Our key insight is simple—the platform can
precompute the timestamps for future up and down durations
and then lazily update those duration timestamps. At any
current time, for a view request, the platform operator can
use the current timestamp to determine if the post should be in
up or down duration (using the precomputed up/down duration
timestamps) and return a post in case the post is in up duration
or return null otherwise. The only exception is if the data owner
requested to view her own post, the post should be returned,
irrespective of up/down duration.
An improved Lethe implementation. We note that instead
of keeping track of the observable state, a process can simply
compute the observable state of an ASO using the current
timestamp and the precomputed up/down duration timestamps.
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Active Storage Object (ASO) for post 1 
State:
post id, content, owner auth token,
other metadata
Code (handlers)
ASO for
post 2
Time server ASO runtime
Active Subsystem
Routing substrate (searches and return ASOs)
Users
(including
adversaries)
Platform
operator
Fig. 10. A basic implementation schematic for Lethe . Each post is an
ASO, and using APIs and code handlers these ASOs can be accessed.
An operator can add more metadate to the ASO content according to
requirement of the platform.
Thus, when the platform operator adds each post ASO, they
should also add (in bulk) the timestamps corresponding to
up and down durations for a large time period in future
(e.g., for next one year). Specifically we present the basic
schematic of our proposed implementation in Figure 10. Each
post ASO contains a state which includes the post content, an
authentication token to identify the owner of the post (who
can delete the post) and timestamps for future up and down
durations. Both users (including adversaries) and platform uses
a routing substrate to find ASOs in the distributed storage
(e.g., via a hash table of keys). The active subsystem contains
a trusted time server and the ASO runtime, which converts
platform and user API calls to ASO handlers and executes the
ASO handler code.
Table IV contains the summary of API and ASO handler
code descriptions. We use authentication (or auth) tokens to
identify a user (to determine data owner or not). Any user
can create a post using her auth token with put or delete her
posts using delete. Handler code for call get first checks the
auth token and if the request is from data owner the platform
always returns the post (if it is not deleted). If the get request
is not from a data owner, then (using the precomputed up/down
durations) the handler code checks if the current timestamp is
within the up of down time duration. If the current timestamp
falls in an up duration for the post then the platform returns
the post’s content to the requesting user, otherwise the platform
returns null. In addition to get, put and delete, the platform
operator internally runs multiple processes with updateTS
function to keep adding future up and down time durations for
ASO objects. The “post ids” to update (given to updateTS)
should be divided in these processes based on a hash table of
ASO keys. The mapping between API and ASO handler codes
is in 3rd column of Table IV.
Possible optimizations of this implementation sketch. We
emphasize that this is just a sketch Lethe implementation with
scopes for further optimization. E.g., updateTS can addition-
ally delete up/down timestamps lesser than current timestamp
to optimize storage or there can be batch garbage collection
after multiple calls to delete. Further the input to updateTS
can be chosen more intelligently e.g., by keeping a min-heap
to determine the ASO objects which are in immediate need
to update up/down timestamp. We leave exploration of these
concrete system challenges to future work.
APIs for the user (including adversary)
Name Parameter Description Associated
ASO
handlers
put post content, au-
thentication token
Creates a post ASO for the
data owner, returns a post id
onPut
get post id, authenti-
cation token
Returns a post ASO or null
depending on (i) ownership
and (ii) if the post is in
up/down duration.
onGet
delete post id, authenti-
cation token
deletes associated post and
returns null.
onDelete
Internal APIs for the platform
Name Parameter Description Associated
ASO
handlers
updateTS list of post ids to
update
Updates the future up/down
times in ASOs with post ids.
onUpdate
Handlers in ASOs
Name Parameter Description Associated
ASO
handlers
onPut post content,
authentica-
tion token, cur-
rent timestamp
Creates an ASO object and
assigns up/down timestamps
covering next 1 year.
-
onGet post id, authenti-
cation token, cur-
rent timestamp
Check current timestamp and
if in up duration return post
content, else return null.
-
onDelete post id, authenti-
cation token, cur-
rent timestamp
Assign one down
timestamp—infinity; remove
post content.
-
onUpdate post id, authenti-
cation token, cur-
rent timestamp
If current set of up/down
times cover less than 1 year,
create more up/down times.
-
TABLE IV. SUMMARY OF API AND ASO HANDLER CODE
DESCRIPTIONS (AND THE MAPPING BETWEEN THEM) FOR Lethe SKETCH
IMPLEMENTATION. NOTE THAT DATA OWNER ALWAYS GETS BACK HER
NON-DELETED POSTS IRRESPECTIVE OF UP/DOWN DURATION.
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